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Alternative theories of state development proposed by Cartteiro 
(1970) and Wilier (1977) are presented and discussed briefly. Each 
is considered in terms of its applicability to the development of the 
Hittite Empire of ancient Turkey. It is concluded that Miller's 
framework, which allows a central role to factors external to the 
prevailing system, is more useful for the analysis of the case of the 
Hittite state and, in general, may have greater scope and predictive 
ability. 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert L. Carneiro (1970), in an article entitled, "A Theory 
of the Origin of the State," gives an interpretation of state 
development based on data concerning the Mesopotamia*!, 
Egyptian, and Central American Empires of antiquity. Several 
years later, David Wilier (1977), in a paper entitled, "A Network 
Interpretation of Carneiro's Theory of the Origin of the State," 
proposed an alternative interpretation designed, not to replace, 
but to complete the examination of state and empire origins. 
Given these alternative interpretations, it is the intent of this 
article to present new data and evaluate the applicability of the 
proposed theories in light of the new data. My intent is not to 
provide a formal test of the theories, but rather to shed light on 
their relative scope and precision. Therefore, neither theory will 
actually be 'proven' or 'disprovcn'; more accurately, they will be 
evaluated. 
The data to be used in the following evaluation conies from 
the ancient history of what is now the country of Turkey. From 
1900 B.C. to 1200 B.C. there thrived an empire which rivaled the 
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Egypt of Ramses II. The land was called Hatti, the people, 
Hittites. Only recently has the Hittitc story come to light. 
Consequently, theoretical interpretation of various aspects of the 
Hittite Empire has not yet taken place. Therefore, the Hittite 
history is well suited for the task at hand. 
PRE-STATE ANATOLIA' 
In order to fully comprehend the rise of the Hittite state, it is 
imperative that one understand the system operating prior to state 
formation. Even before 1900 B.C., Anatolia (Asia Minor) was 
recognized as a land rich in resources. As would become more and 
more evident, the variety and volume of its metal deposits was its 
most significant asset. It was the exploitation and development of 
these metal deposits which supported the prevailing system and 
fostered the growth of the state. 
Archeological evidence suggests that, as early as 30,000 B.C., 
raw materials were being transported to areas in which they were 
scarce. The demand for metals, however, became most acute with 
the beginnings of horticulture and the domestication of animals 
around 9000 B.C. Tools were needed to work the ground, and 
tools of metal proved more efficient and durable than ones made 
from other materials. However, unless one found himself near a 
convenient deposit, inferior tools had to be used. Given an 
agrarian lifestyle, mobility was quite limited, and some system of 
trade was necessary. 
The kingdoms of Mesopotamia were lands rich in agricultural 
potential, yet lacking in the resources necessary to make them 
flower. Eventually, a trading network was established which 
connected various centers on the Anatolian plateau with the 
civilizations of the Tigris-Euphrates valleys. Evidence supports the 
presence of specialized trading centers, called karums, as early as 
7000 B.C. These centers, which showed no other means of 
support, conducted routinized trading operations. Assyrian 
merchants (the leaders in trade at that time) generally took up 
full-time residence in these centers and, in some cases, took 
Anatolian wives. 
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The Assyrians and others of Mesopotamia clearly wanted 
silver, gold, and copper. For these commodities, they traded 
woolen cloth, manufactured clothing of various types and, most 
importantly, tin. Tin was the one metal most scarce in Anatolia, as 
well as the most important to the development of an Anatolian 
bronze-age economy; tin and copper are necessary for the 
production of the harder alloy, bronze. 
By the latter part of the third millennium B.C., the Anatolian 
trading system had evolved into a land of small city-states with 
their rulers living in castles. Their economies were based primarily 
on agriculture, but their real wealth and importance resided in 
metals and metal products. Gurney (1954:19) speculates that 
before the Hittites, there were at least ten small principalities in 
the Anatolian plateau and perhaps even more. The resulting 
activity of these city-states and petty kingdoms involved 
occasional warring activities with varying degrees of success; 
alliances were often formed and, here and there, short-lived 
ententes cordials appeared. But of these, there were none which 
were successful in concentrating their power and dominating any 
significant portion of Anatolia. Instead, Anatolian society of the 
third millennium B.C. was characterized by a number of separate 
but interdependent principalities. 
Until about 1780 B.C., the Assyrian-Anatolian relationship 
was maintained peacefully. Of utmost importance to this 
relationship was the maintenance and accessibility of the trade 
routes by which the goods flowed. However, around 1780 B.C., a 
people known as the Hurrians had successfully spread across 
northern Mesopotamia toward the Mediterranean and had begun 
to achieve political supremacy in the states on the upper Tigris and 
Euphrates and in the hills bordering on southeast Anatolia. As a 
result, Assyria was cut off from her commercial colonies and her 
power quickly collapsed. She was soon incorporated into the 
expanding empire of Hammurabi of Babylon. For the Anatolians, 
the loss of their tin supplies was similarly disasterous. On the 
whole, the cities that flourished during the period of the Assyrian 
merchant-colonies went into a decline from which they were never 
able to resurrect themselves. The bond which had loosely tied the 
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communities was broken, and the resulting isolation of 
trade-dependent communities and principalities was devasting. 
THEORIES ON THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 
Given the apparent disarray and general depression of the 
Anatolian principalities, due primarily to the loss of tin supplies, 
the question concerns how the Hittite Empire arose. That the 
Hittitcs became an empire of significance is well documented (see 
Hicks, 1974), and thus serves as an adequate test of the scope and 
applicability of the following theories. 
Canieiro 
In order to study the origins of the state it is essential to 
understand what the state is. Accordingly, Carneiro 
(1970:733-738) defines a state as an autonomous political unit, 
encompassing many communities within its territory and having a 
centralized government with power to collect taxes, draft men for 
work or war, and decree and enforce laws. Carneiro claims that in 
general, this did not begin to take place until around 5000 B.C. 
Three related forces combined to foster state formation: 
environmental circumscription, resource concentration, and social 
circumscription. 
Environmental circumscription operates where productive 
land areas arc sharply and severely bounded by difficult or 
nonproductive land. As examples, Carneiro cites river valley 
empires such as the Valley of Mexico, the Nile Valley, the Indus 
Valley, and Mesopotamia in the Tigris-Euphrates river valleys. In 
these cases, the river valleys arc the only viable alternatives for 
habitation. Lands outside the valley are not productive, and the 
difficulty of moving to another valley is prohibitive. The 
consequence of such circumscription is eventual overcrowding. 
More land is needed for agricultural production (given the existing 
state of technology), but due to population increases, less land is 
available. Warfare among neighboring settlements over land is the 
next step. The victors incorporate the land into their domain, 
often sparing the conquered in return for increased production 
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efforts achieved through intensification of present methods and 
some invention. This process is repeated until the entire valley is 
ruled by one group. 
The second force is resource concentration. In this instance, 
although geographic mobility is not hampered severely, a 
particular area is seen as being so much more advantageous than 
any other that people often choose the consequences of 
overcrowding to the choice of moving away. A potential 
consequence of such a choice is subjugation and the exaction of a 
tribute. However, in the long run the decision to stay provides 
more benefits than a move to a less crowded area. According to 
Carneiro, resource concentration stimulated the chiefdoms of 
Amazonia. 
Social circumscription provides the third force for state 
development. The Yanomamo Indians of Venezuela, for example, 
lived in an extensive region of noncircumscribcd rainforest, away 
from any large river. However in this case there is no even spread 
of settlements; rather, the area has a definable core. Consequently, 
those near the center do not have the same alternatives as those 
inhabiting the perimeter. A frequent result is that those located in 
or near the center of the habitated area are, in effect, locked in by 
those around them. Overcrowding of the central area results and 
conflict over land ensues. The results are the same as in the two 
previous cases; one group effectively dominates the other and 
exacts a tribute from them. 
In short, population density and some form of 
circumscription, which leads to land scarcity, are the necessary 
prerequisites for state development. In other words, Carneiro is 
proposing a wholly internal description of the process of state 
development. Counter to this claim is that of David Wilier (1977). 
Witter 
Circumscription, in Willer's argument, is in fact an important 
aspect. But whereas Carneiro's concern was with population size, 
Wilier examines the possibility and the costs of administering and 
maintaining a state. The primary variable here is area, specifically, 
the size of the area to be coerced, administered, and maintained. 
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In immediate relation to area is the cost involved in the state 
process. Thus, as Wilier points out, the costs of coercing a 
population for purposes of taxation are not simply a function of 
the size of that group, but are more closely related to the size of 
the area administered. Consequently, for any given area (and thus 
for any given cost of coercion), the total product which can be 
extracted from the population for a given cost of administration 
of that area increases as the population increases. 
Area and cost relationships are made manifest in a number of 
different ways. Cost efficiency can be increased through coercion 
of agriculturalists who practice annual or semi-annual cropping. 
This allows routinization of taxation and cyclical, rather than 
continuous, coercion. With the use of cyclical coercion, it is not 
surprising that the early states did not necessarily take a significant 
role in the maintenance of 'internal tranquility.' The point of 
Willer's argument is that judicious application of coercive efforts 
can bring a population under state domination without the 
necessity of an overcrowded population. 
Scarcity of land need not be the only stimulus for state 
formation. Willer's formulation also provides for the possibility of 
an invasion of some prevailing system by some other force 
external to the system. The invasion can take place at nearly any 
point in the growth curve of the native population. Therefore, 
state development could begin prior to the point at which some 
region becomes overcrowded, i.e., the point at which 
overcrowding would lead to conflict over land. 
Around the perimeter of cultivatable land there often are 
people who maintain themselves by hunting or herding. Given the 
highly mobile nature of these people's lifestyle, there can occur a 
rather high number of hostile encounters in a relatively large area 
of low population density. The encounters tend to occur for the 
s a m e r e a s o n s as t h o s e a m o n g ove rc rowded 
agriculturalists resource scarcity and concentration. The 
significant consequence of such repeated contracts is what Wilier 
calls a 'culture of ferocity.' This culture of ferocity is generated 
and maintained by a system of normative convergence. It is 
manifested in an interest of each member of a given group in 
having all other members of his group being highly fierce. For any 
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individual nomad, being surrounded by people of intense ferocity 
insures his own survival. The insurance is manifested in being able 
to obtain necessities of survival in spite of scarcity, concentration, 
or competition. If any weak link in the armor is found, the 
interests of all others in the group converge and dictate the 
resolution of the problem through a variety of negative sanctions. 
For those who live within a culture of ferocity it is possible 
to receive a wide range of negative sanctions with little or no 
preference-state alteration; i.e., all but the most extreme forms of 
coercion fail to change one's mind concerning some intended 
activity. This is due in part to their continual experience of 
'minor' forms of negative sanctions. Such groups thus have the 
culture appropriate to ruling classes, but not to being ruled, due in 
part to their resistance to coercion. 2 
Thus, there is a potential of a culture of ferocity bordering 
the land of agriculturalists. It is not unlikely that these fierce 
peoples would have hostile encounters not only with others like 
themselves but also with agriculturalists near the edge of the 
workable land. Given a fully successful conflict with 
agriculturalists, the application of routinized coercion would result 
in a state, in short, the state would be a product of invasion from 
without, and not necessarily a result of conflict over land. In other 
circumstances, a series of less successful predations would result in 
the development of full-time defense units, at least among those at 
the edges of the agricultural land. In turn, these agriculturalists 
would become fierce and hostile toward others in the area and 
achieve the conditions of internal state development. The point is 
that over-population and land scarcity are not necessarily the only 
elements antecedent to a state. In this interpretation the state can 
develop by invasion or the threat of invasion. 
EVALUATION 
In order to determine the 'fit' of these theories to the case of 
the Hittitcs, evidence will be given concerning both the origin of 
the Hittites and the sequence of events leading up to state 
formation. 
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Research by philologists indicates that it is unlikely that the 
original 'homeland' of the Indo-European languages was Anatolia. 
The Hittite language has been confirmed to be Indo-European. 
This means that the speakers of an Indo-European language such 
as the Hittites must have entered Anatolia from some other area 
(Macqueen, 1975). 
General agreement on the linguistic evidence points to an 
Indo-European 'homeland' somewhere in the area that stretches 
from the lower Danube along the northern shore of the Black Sea 
to the northern foothills of the Caucasus. The question then 
concerns the route by which these people entered Anatolia. The 
possibilities are 1) the northwest via the Dardanelles and the 
Bosporus, or 2) from the northeast via the passes of the Caucasus. 
Several pieces of evidence support the northeastern route of 
migration as the one used by the Hittites for entry into Anatolia. 
According to John Garstang (1910:320-321) most scholars agree 
on a mountain origin for the Hittites. Two factors strongly suggest 
the mountains as the Hittite home. One is the footgear of the 
Hittites, which is always represented as a shoe or boot with 
upturned toe. This is commonly supposed to be the natural form 
of snow shoe for highland regions and is believed to be specially 
adapted to walking upon broken and stony ground. A further 
suggestion for the mountain origin is the dominance of mountain 
cults found in the Hittite pantheon. Garstand (1910) concludes 
that the mountains through which the Hittites reached the plateau 
of Asia Minor lie eastward in Armenia the Caucasus. The key 
point here is that the environment of the pre-state Hittites was 
quite conducive to a culture of ferocity, and thus well-suited for a 
conquering and ruling class. 
The Hittites arrived in Anatolia sometime around 2000 B.C. 
Given the Caucasus route, one of the first encounters of the 
Hittites with native Anatolians must have been at or near the city 
of Divrigi. Divrigi was situated at the northern end of the 
Tigris-Euphrates river valleys. These valleys served as northern 
routes for the trading of tin from the east to the west, 
circumventing the land occupied by the Hurrians. In time, Divrigi 
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was taken by the Hittites. The culture of ferocity, with its 
accompanying knowledge of military tactics, no doubt figured 
significantly in the take-over. Archeological evidence shows that 
after the initial take-over, the Hittites immediately undertook to 
subdue and dominate the surrounding area. The result was the 
establishment of the small state of Kussara (Macqueen, 1975). 
The most important consequence of the establishment of the 
state of Kussara for the eventual establishment of a Hittite Empire 
was control of the only remaining tin routes between east and 
west. These routes went north of the Hurrian occupation. Control 
of these northern routes put the Hittites in a most commanding 
position with respect to the rest of Anatolia. Later the Hittites 
were to move south, presumably in search of control of the 
southern trading routes. The process of their expansion is the 
topic of the following section. 
T/ie Hittite Process 
The Hittites apparently were greatly concerned with the costs 
of expansion and the problems of management. For example, they 
once advanced as far as Babylon and sacked it yet made no 
attempt to hold it as part of their empire. The process was fully 
routinized and rational. 
Campaigning began in the spring with the melting of the deep 
snows in the Hittite homeland and generally continued throughout 
the summer months. In autumn the king returned to Hattusas to 
deal with diplomatic correspondence, hand down decisions on 
political cases, and consult with the city's governor on the 
administration of the capitol. In winter the king began his annual 
tour of provincial capitols. This served to keep him in touch with 
his empire. Most important were his religious duties as high priest 
of the land. This was necessary to keep the gods on his side .Spring 
brought on another season of campaigns. (Hicks, 1974:99) 
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The logic behind this routine proved to be quite effective. By 
campaigning in the spring and summer, the highly effective Hittite 
army was able to encounter others while they were occupied with 
agricultural jobs. But why, it might be asked, were the Hittites not 
similarly occupied? The answer lies in the control of the Divrigi tin 
routes. By regulating the flow of goods through Divrigi, the 
Hittites could ensure that they would be well supplied at all times. 
And, through their superior military capabilities, the Hittites could 
demand increased production from the lands they already 
controlled. 
By returning to the capitol in the fall, the Hittites were ready 
for the annual paying of homage. With cyclic cropping that begins 
in the spring, the time for harvest is in the fall. Thus, it is during 
the fall that the coerced states are able to pay. At any other time 
the Hittites would undoubtedly meet with resistance due to the 
scarcity of surplus grains. By tapping the reserves at their fullest, 
two conditions are supported. First, there will be taxable produce. 
Second, and perhaps even more important, the perceived costs to 
those coerced arc not as great as when there is less. 
With the coming of winter the Hittite king left the capitol 
again, but this time not for military conquest; this time the 
campaign was political. Nearly every agricultural collectivity held 
some religious festival after the harvest was complete. Having the 
dual role of chief of state and chief priest of the land, the Hittite 
king made the rounds of local festivals and presided over and 
participated in them. By appearing to take an interest in the local 
affairs, the Hittite monarch could reinforce his position and image 
among the real producers of the state. 
Potetitial vs. Actual Coercion 
Evidence of the early expansion of the Hittite Empire 
indicates that superior military force was the prime mode of 
operation. However, in terms of empire-building and management 
costs, physical coercion alone proves quite costly. Thus, actual 
coercion had to give way to a more cost-conscious, yet similarly 
effective operation-potential coercion. 
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Through earlier military campaigns the Hittite army had 
more than established themselves as a power capable of carrying 
out its intentions; they were feared. Thus, the threat of actual 
coercion served as the catalyst for further empire expansion and 
management. The usual procedure was to dispatch a letter 
demanding the extradition of Hittite subjects who had taken 
refuge in the enemy's territory. If the demand was refused, a 
second letter would follow, charging the enemy with having 
committed the first act of aggression and referring the affair to the 
judgment of heaven, to be settled by the ordeal of war (Gurney, 
1952:114). Knowing of the military capabilities of the Hittites, at 
least three of their neighboring states apparently volunteered for 
Hittite vassalage (Hicks, 1974:73). In the event that subjugation 
was not so simple, then military operations were instigated. If 
surrender was offered by the enemy state and accepted by the 
Hittites no further action would be taken against the suppliant's 
territory. As a vassal, he would receive back his kingdom, a treaty 
would be drawn up, and he would undertake to perform all the 
specific duties required of him (Gurney, 1952:116). However, a 
city conquered by force of arms was generally looted and burned 
to the ground; the inhabitants of such a conquered place would be 
transplanted, with their cattle, to Hattusas and distributed as serfs 
among the Hittite officers and dignitaries. It is significant that 
there is no evidence of ill treatment and cruelty (Gurney, 
1952.115). 
Thus, there seems to have been a calm but powerfully 
persuasive tone in the expansion of the Hittite Empire. Even in the 
cases of cities taken by force, there was a tendency to maintain 
the status quo. An allegiance with a cooperative and loyal vassal 
was much more valued than physical dominance of an enemy. The 
costs of empire maintenance were thereby reduced for the Hittites 
by passing them on to the already established system. However, 
the reduced costs did not result in reduced production of the 
system; the threat of future action was still present if Hittite 
demands were not met. An interesting example of Hittite 
procedure is recounted in the story of Aitakama: 
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Sutatara and his son Aiukama, with their war chariots, bore down 
upon him (Subbi-luHuma) and gave battle. Though he was prepared 
to respect these adversaries, Subbi-luliuma was not slow to respond 
to punish this provocation; the king and his son, together with 
many of the chiefs, were taken prisoners and sent in triumph to the 
capitol. The fate of Sutatara is unknown, but Aitakama reappeared 
later, reinstated in his kingdom, and a faithful ally of the Hittites, 
who entrusted him with command of the Syrian armies. (Garstang, 
1931:331). 
Historical accounts of the Hittites often refer to the above 
behavior as evidence of the intrinsic humaneness of the Hittite 
people. Humane though it may be, it is nonetheless calculated and 
rational. There are two negative results of continued use of force 
in conquest. First, as the empire expands, the costs of military 
campaigns to annex another area must reach a point of 
diminishing returns. It must be remembered that we are examining 
the second millennium B.C. with all of its limitations of 
transportation and communication. The second factor deals with 
the primary purpose of the conquest. The role of the state was not 
to invent new methods but to intensify existing means. If the 
Hittites were to "rape, pillage, and plunder," they would only 
hamper the ability of the conquered to produce the surplus 
desired. Further, to merely acquire land without a population to 
make it productive would only prove a burden to administration. 
Thus potential coercion, not population density, was the 
means by which the empire was generated and expanded. It also 
served as the means by which the empire was administered. In the 
initial stages after acquisition, all vassals and satellite countries 
were glued to the Hittite Empire by written words. Treaties, a 
rarity at that time, outlined precisely the nature of the 
relationship between Hatti and the annexed land. Copies of the 
treaties were given to all involved parties (Hicks, 1974:74). The 
written word was then backed by certain pledges to the gods as 
witnesses. For the Hittites, the oath (treaty), with its solemn 
religious associations, was fundamental and was evidently regarded 
as a powerful sanction. The gods of both parties were usually 
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involved for the religious outlook of the time was strongly 
national (Gurney, 1952:75). 
In the use of the gods as witnesses, the effort was to establish 
the threat of supernatural sanction in addition to the physical 
threat of the Hittite army. In so doing, the Hittites made the point 
that their gods were in fact superior to the local deities. The 
symbolic nature of these efforts is aptly shown in the formal 
presentation of the Hittite pantheon. In a massive wall carving just 
outside the capitol city, the two main Hittite gods are shown 
facing each other in larger than life stature. The other gods, 
smaller in size, are arranged behind one or the other Hittite god 
with hands raised in submissive gestures. When shown this wall, 
vassal officials were in no doubt of their relationship to the 
Hittites, supernaturally or otherwise. 
In order to make the system work and their threats effective, 
two tasks must be accomplished. First, the basic element of the 
ancient system, the peasant and the village must be reached by 
the threat. Second, once the peasant has been reached, the threat 
must reduce his alternative courses of action. This was done by 
making use of the dominance hierarchies already in existence In 
order to understand how this is accomplished, a model of the 
system will be of assistance. 
The alternatives given the vassal lord were either to pay or be 
removed (which could mean" anything from execution to 
enslavement) and replaced. If the vassal lord agreed to pay, then it 
was left up to him to devise a means of extracting the payment 
from his own people. Generally the vassal lord had a similar 
relationship with the leaders of the villages in his domain. These 
leaders, the elders/priests, were given the same alternatives that the 
Hittites gave to the vassal lord. The goal was to stimulate more 
production from each village in order to make the payments to the 
Hittites. 
In the model the elders/priests are seen as getting information 
from their own gods and passing it on to the peasants. In part, this 
information consists of advice on agricultural matters which will 
help increase production. In other instances this information 
consists of reminders of the vassal's relation to the Hittites-both 
earthly and spiritually. The relationship, of course, is that of the 
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continuous potential threat. If the level of production in the 
village is too low, the potential threat may become actual. 
The Hittite threat now reached the productive units- the 
peasants. This created a reduction of alternatives for the peasant. 
If he did not produce at a required level he knew that he would 
suffer sanctions from his gods, the vassal lord, the Hittites and 
their gods, etc. However, the system of dominance was designed 
such that an entire village was held responsible for its quota. Thus, 
the Hittites had brought into play the internal dynamics of a 
normative control system. 
Given the alternatives available (and merely leaving the 
situation was not one which was available), any one peasant had a 
strong interest in every other peasant producing just as much as he 
possibly could. Thus, when any one peasant failed to live up to 
production expectations, he was sanctioned—not by the 
elders/priests, the vassal lord, the Hittites, or the gods, but by his 
own status peers. In order to protect themselves, the peers made 
sure that the slow producer increased production or paid the 
consequences. In the cases of individual or small group resistance, 
those further up in the hierarchy rarely if ever had to exercise 
their coercive roles. As long as the belief system of the peasants 
was such that normative convergence (negative sanctioning by 
status peers) continued, the Hittites would eventually receive their 
payment and all others in the system would be maintained. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Hittite Empire qualifies as a state according to 
Carnciro's own definition, it is obvious that the process of state 
development was quite different from the one Carneiro proposed. 
From the massive 'libraries of clay' which the Hittites left, we 
know that the Hittite state developed into a complex system of 
domination. From an initial invasion, the Hittites elaborated on 
the preceding system of organization among the city-states. The 
result was a rational and routinized system of dominance, 
developed and administered on the basis of potential coercion and 
manifested in the system of normative convergence on the village 
level. It is interesting to note that normative convergence was the 
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mode of group existance of the nomadic period of the Hittite 
history. Its success was based on the capability of the Hittites to 
1) actualize potential coercion, and 2) alter the belief system of its 
own population so that potential coercion need be actualized only 
occasionally. 
With respect to Carneiro's interpretation, the focus on 
population densities has been shown to be unnecessary in the case 
of the Hittites. The pre-Hittite system was incapable of achieving 
state status, as evidenced by the unsuccessful attempts of some 
cities to extend their domination. The stimulus for state 
development was external to the prevailing system; the Hittites 
invaded Anatolia. Had the population been overcrowded, 
according to Carnciro's theory, we would expect a state to have 
been in existance in Anatolia prior to Hittite contact. Thus it is 
concluded that potential coercion, rather than population density, 
was the motivating force. 
Given that Willer's interpretation of external stimuli appears 
to explain the data rather accurately, the question now centers on 
the status of Carneiro's theory. The mark of a complete theory is 
that it can explain not only what has happened (history), but also 
what will happen (the future). Thus in certain cases, Carneiro's 
interpretation of state development is certainly adequate. 
However, the scope of his theory's application is quite narrow. 
The Hittite case shows that another interpretation may be 
necessary. To conclude that Carneiro's theory has been disproven 
would be in error. To conclude that the case of the Hittites is 
more accurately interpreted by Willer's framework, based on his 
"elementary theory," is more proper. 
NOTES 
1. The major source for evidence on pre-Hittite Anatolia, when not 
otherwise cited, is Macqueen, 1975:1-21. 
2. The Kaskans, a hunting tribe of the northern Anatolian mountains, 
provide a useful example. Though not an organized nation, the Kaskan 
warriors had been a thorn in Hatti's northern flank for more than 150 
Hittite Empire 
years. For those 150 years, the Kaskans kept the empire's northern 
border continually in turmoil. Even at the height of Hittite expansion, 
the boundary of effective Hittite control rarely extended more than a 
few dozen miles north of the capital city of Hattusas. Sometime around 
1300 B.C., when the Hittites* energies were absorbed elsewhere, the 
Kaskans even managed to penetrate Hattusas' defenses and plunder the 
city. The occupation was only temporary, but the role of the Kaskan's 
culture of ferocity was nonetheless most significant. (Hicks, 1974:143). 
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